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Recently, there has been a surge in AI-powered 
products. Often marketed as “free”, these services 
operate as hooks to lure unsuspecting users into 
voluntarily giving up data about every aspect of their 
life. Their data is the primary fuel of surveillance 
capitalism, a new economic system that exclusively 
benefits so-called Big Tech organisations at the 
expense of personal privacy and freedom of choice. 
This paper argues the ways these AI-powered 
products are being imagined and designed is further 
generalising a kind of “enframing” that encourages a 
bureaucratic relationship with the world disguised as 
(a false sense of) augmented agency. This paper 
shows that technologically informed philosophical 
reflections can contribute to getting ourselves back 
into the feedback loop of technological mediation by 
helping us recognise our “becoming” with 
technologies as a design process. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
In the last years, thanks to recent developments in AI 
methods, computing hardware, and network 
connectivity, there has been a surge in “smart” 
devices claiming to improve people’s lives. Thanks to 
ubiquitous computing, multitudes of objects in our 
built environment can double as interactive and 
interconnected nodes for the Internet, and as sensors 
that gather data about every aspect of human life. 
The growing stream of information generated by the 
Internet of Things (IoT) is allowing organisations 
employing new machine learning methods and data 
gathering to make detailed, albeit questionably 
accurate, forecasts about our behaviour (McNeil, 
2018; O’Neil, 2016; Thompson, 2019; van Dijck, 
2014; Varghese, 2019). 
The rationale behind the development of AI-powered 
devices and services often invokes User-Centered 
Design (UCD) principles, as well as Weiser’s 
(1991/1999) optimistic vision of ubiquitous 
computing. The reasoning is first that by anticipating 
people’s needs and providing relevant contextual 
information and suggestions, technologies will 
become not only more usable but useful and 
meaningful; secondly, that by offering this level of 
tailoring while blending unobtrusively into the 
background and remaining ready-to-hand, smart 
devices and services will further improve people’s 
overall experience of daily life. However, recent 
events such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
(Gadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018) and the role 
of YouTube in the growth of far-right politics (Fischer 
& Taub, 2019) have raised serious questions about 
our relationship with smart technologies at large and 
with so-called Big Tech in particular. 
Automating tasks with the help of artificial devices is 
arguably a defining human feature (Martinho-
Truswell, 2018). While humans are not the only 
creatures that employ tools, no other animal’s 
development, behaviour, and well-being is so 
strongly shaped by technology as ours (Ihde & 
Malafouris, 2018). So called Big Tech organisations 
providing data-based AI-powered products are 
surreptitiously exploiting with impunity our 
technological susceptibilities. Their business models 
have given rise to “surveillance capitalism”. This 
economic system follows a radically new logic of 
accumulation fuelled by data analytics that is 
curtailing our privacy, our freedom of choice 
(Naughton, 2019; Zuboff, 2015, 2019), and even our 
capacity to self-transform. Through dishonest forms 
of automation that “hypernudge” (Yeung, 2016) and 
effectively lock people into behaviours and processes 
“for which they have no legitimate need or desire” 
(Girardin, 2019), the new “Data Barons” (Mayer-
Schönberger & Cukier, 2013) alienate people from 
their information and decision-making. [1] Moreover, 
these levels of control show the degree to which the 
“corporate bureaucratic culture” (Graeber, 2012) has 
taken over society, deliberately putting otherwise 
“poetic technologies” [2] entirely under the service of 
“total bureaucratisation”. 
This paper argues the way AI-powered IoT devices 
are being designed is not only consolidating 
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surveillance capitalism but also promoting a limiting 
technological “enframing” (see Zwier, Blok, & 
Lemmens, 2016) disguised as augmented agency. It 
shows that despite claiming to follow UCD principles, 
smart devices and services offering hyper-
personalisation are generalising plutocratic, 
unimaginative interactions with the world. This paper 
admits there are no immediate solutions to “fix” the 
above issues, but claims that a good starting point is 
making sure that, when it comes to augmenting 
agency, human freedom of choice is always 
privileged. It contends that keeping humans on the 
(decision) feedback loop means calling into question 
the idea that AI-powered devices need to operate 
seamlessly in the background of human experience, 
for this often implies trading human control for 
technical convenience. Furthermore, it argues that 
we need to rethink what we understand by the user’s 
real needs and requirements and what UCD means 
in the age of smart automation. 
2 | THE PERILS OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 
In our “hyperhistorical” information-dependent 
societies, [3] the built environment is being 
increasingly populated by billions of sensors 
embedded within IoT devices. Human activities have 
become overwhelmingly mediated by computational 
technology. This is a radical shift because, unlike 
previous forms of automation, [4] computers 
“informate” processes; i.e., they generate data about 
when they are used, for which purpose, and by whom, 
thus making the most minute details about their 
usage knowable (Zuboff, 2015). As a result, 
potentially every human activity can be “datafied”, [5] 
i.e., “rendered in a new symbolic dimension as 
events, objects, processes”, thus making people and 
their behaviour “visible, knowable, and shareable” 
(2015, p. 78). This availability of data (rather than 
breakthroughs in algorithm design per se) is what 
allows contemporary AI methods to achieve the 
unprecedented levels of efficiency and accuracy they 
exhibit today. 
The vast amounts of data generated directly or 
indirectly by smart devices are collected, stored, 
abstracted, aggregated, and analysed [6] by Big Tech 
and by every emerging organisation wanting to take 
part in the contemporary economy. Usually, these 
organisations contend that it is only by knowing their 
users intimately (i.e., by gaining access to their 
everyday data), that the products and services they 
offer can reduce “frictions”, i.e., become more 
efficient, usable, more comfortable to live with, and 
desirable. This argument echoes the general 
principles of UCD, which is arguably the dominant 
approach in product development, Interaction 
Design, User Experience Design, and other fields 
within the tech industry. 
UCD, a cluster of processes with its origins in early 
Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) research, 
privileges a humanistic outlook, arguing that user’s 
needs ought to be put above the system’s functional 
requirements when designing (Baek, Cagiltay, 
Boling, & Frick, 2007; Norman & Draper, 1986; 
Wallach & Scholz, 2012). Knowing users nowadays 
is not merely reduced to carrying out market research 
in the traditional sense (Floridi, 2019; Ruckenstein & 
Granroth, 2019). It makes sense for organisations to 
engage in large-scale data collection. Whether this 
information yields actual knowledge about the user is 
beyond the point. The problem, however, is that 
having in mind the user’s needs is rarely the case, 
particularly when it comes to AI-powered devices and 
services. 
Automation has, at least since the Industrial 
Revolution, allowed organisations to reduce costs 
and increase revenues; adopting AI-driven 
automation is, therefore, a reasonable, logical step. 
AI is data-hungry; it needs vast amounts of input to 
operate, adapt and grow; this explains in part why 
organisations are also eagerly adopting Big Data 
schemes and practices. [7] However, there is another 
more disturbing reason why most organisations now 
deliberately design their products and services to 
extract as much data as possible from their 
customers: users themselves have become the 
resource and the product as well as their target. 
As Foster & McChesney (2014) and Zuboff (2015) 
argue, Big Data embodies the new logic of 
appropriation and accumulation underpinning a novel 
economic system which they have named 
“surveillance capitalism”. Surveillance capitalism 
emerged from the auction-style advertising model 
Google pioneered in the early 2000s, wherein 
companies pay to have their ads tailored based on 
user’s data and behaviour patterns. Since then, this 
model has been adopted and refined by the FAANGS 
[8] (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Spotify) 
and by almost every other major technology 
company. 
Under surveillance capitalism, organisations 
appropriate people’s “data exhaust”—that is, the data 
people shed as a by-product of their actions and 
movements in the world (Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier, 2013)—to forecast and modify their behaviour 
to increase revenue and obtain further market control 
(Zuboff, 2015, pp. 75–80). Under surveillance 
capitalism, people are offered access to convenient 
services they presumably want (e.g., participating in 
a social network) in exchange for accepting an 
unrelenting invasion of their privacy. The problem, as 
Zuboff (2015) notes, is that privacy implies deciding 
whether one wants to keep something secret or not. 
By “hyper-nudging” (see Yeung, 2016) users into 
surrendering their ability to keep their information, 
their beliefs, and their wishes, the new Data Barons 
are limiting people’s capacity to choose and, 
therefore, are curtailing their fundamental rights. 
Along with being illegitimate, this kind of pact is 
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Faustian because users often ignore the scope, 
degree, and frequency of the surveillance they will be 
subjected to. Their consent thus often resembles that 
of the compulsive gambling addict, as Yeung (2016, 
pp. 131–132) notes. 
Under surveillance capitalism, there are no 
contractual reciprocities. Data extraction is 
automated and unidirectional, a process that leaves 
no space for negotiation or the kind of lawful 
relationships based on social trust. Users’ behaviours 
when interacting with a given service may be 
rewarded or punished based on opaque automated 
decisions—e.g., users may be expelled from the 
service (Kurtis, 2019). This “formal indifference” 
towards the people who are both the sources of data 
and the target of Big Data analytics is the hallmark 
that distinguishes surveillance capitalism from 
previous economic systems (Zuboff, 2015, pp. 76–
80). The “free” services provided by Data Barons are 
not objects of value that are exchanged in a 
transaction but rather serve as “hooks” that lure 
unsuspecting users into an asymmetrical and 
indifferent relationship with a technology (Yeung, 
2016; Zuboff, 2015). Voluntary submission into 
constant surveillance not only curtails our freedom of 
choice but erodes our capacity to self-transform 
because technologies in general and these, in 
particular, have tremendous influence over how we 
perceive the world, as we will see in the following 
section. 
2.1 | BECOMING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 
Traditionally, humanistic analyses concerning 
technological agency, including Critical Theory (in the 
“narrow” and “wide” senses (see Bohman, 2016)) and 
the early philosophy of technology (Heidegger, 
1954/1977b; e.g., Mumford, 1967), regarded 
technologies mostly in pessimistic terms. They 
usually establish a sharp division between human 
nature and technics; portraying technology as a 
tyrannical force that “enframes” [9] our mindset and 
threatens to overwhelm human agency. 
In the last decades, however, there have been two 
important shifts in the way philosophers of technology 
think about “being human”. First, they now recognise 
the artificial dimensions of human nature; they have 
realised that human beings actually “become 
constituted through making and using technologies” 
because tools shape our minds and augment our 
capacities (Ihde & Malafouris, 2018). Secondly, there 
are more attempts to rethink the place of humans in 
the world; to “re-place” human agency (Galanos, 
2017) and develop frameworks that account for the 
agency of non-human agents in our environment. 
Most contemporary posthumanist currents endorse—
with varying degrees of strength—both stances, 
including Actor-Network Theory (ANT), 
postphenomenology, speculative realism, new 
materialism, and informational structural realism, to 
name a few (see for example Bogost, 2012; Cudworth 
& Hobden, 2014; Floridi, 2002; Rosenberger, 2014). 
Crafting and using tools is not exclusive to humans. 
The fact that other animals, such as great apes, birds, 
or cetaceans develop and share technologies, and 
also enjoy doing so is well documented (Garber, 
2014; Jacobs, Bayern, & Osvath, 2016; McCoy et al., 
2019). What distinguishes us from non-human 
animals in terms of technology is not merely the 
degree to which we have incorporated it into our lives 
(which is unparalleled). We use technologies to 
enhance our capacities, but we do it largely by 
delegating tasks to autonomous systems (Martinho-
Truswell, 2018). [10] In so doing, we become 
dependent and hence, intrinsically linked with the 
myriads of devices populating our built environment. 
Unlike non-human animals, our Lebenswelt or 
lifeworld is defined by a constantly evolving 
relationship with artificial objects. [11] It follows, as 
Ihde & Malafouris (2018) suggest, that even though 
human evolution has been usually characterised in 
terms of adaptation, it would be more appropriate to 
describe it in dialectical terms, as a technically-
mediated and often intentional “becoming”. 
Unlike non-human animals, we fabricate our tools and 
therefore we also fabricate our circumstances. To 
paraphrase Ortega y Gasset (1939/1964), a defining 
feature of being human is our constant struggle to 
“make our existence” to bring about what is yet to be. 
As a species, humans are outstanding makers. Our 
technical capacities allow us not only to design and 
manipulate things in our environment but also to 
determine when and how we change; how we self-
consciously “become” (Ihde, 2009). This “self-
fabrication” implies that we continuously find 
ourselves “first and foremost, in the situation of the 
technician” (Ortega y Gasset 1939/1964, p. 341). 
Technically mediated human becoming has arguably 
been going on for a long time, perhaps as far back as 
the time of Acheulean axes (roughly 1.7 million years
  ago). However, in the last decades, we have 
made our world friendlier towards devices that have 
comparatively more agency and autonomy and, 
therefore, a stronger influence over human actions 
and decisions. These artefacts are often “inflexible, 
stubborn, intolerant of mistakes, and unlikely to 
change”; whereas humans tend to be exactly the 
opposite (Floridi, 2012). Clumsy automation can be 
either the result of unintentional “bad design” caused 
by biases, disregard for edge cases, or poor 
calibration; but it can also be deliberately created for 
dishonest reasons, as Girardin (2019) notes. 
As our dependency on smart devices increases so do 
the chances that they end up calling the shots; 
distorting and constraining our behaviour and our 
physical and conceptual environments to further 
accommodate us to them instead of the other way 
around (Floridi, 2012). The danger is that instead of 
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establishing healthy dialectic relationships we end up 
adapting to their “needs” only “because that is the 
best, or sometimes the only, way to make things 
work” (2012, pp. 252–3). Examples abound where 
things have to be done in cumbersome ways to 
accommodate the use of a given technology, even if 
we no longer notice it—e.g., how human movement 
and urban planning, in general, have been 
conditioned by the adoption of motor vehicles. 
Choosing which technologies we incorporate into our 
lives is a crucial matter since they play a key role in 
our self-design (Pitt, 2011). The problem, however, is 
that we lack a method or framework to do so beyond 
simple heuristics because we cannot know in 
advance (only speculate) how a given technology will 
affect our lives in the long term. The problem is made 
worse because we are being surrounded by an 
increasing number of sophisticated systems that are 
specifically designed to influence our behaviour. 
3 | FROM POETIC TO BUREAUCRATIC 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Arguably, the “formal indifference” characterising 
surveillance capitalism is symptomatic of the broader 
cultural shifts brought by more than four decades of 
gradual merging between private and public power in 
the name of profit—i.e., of neoliberalism (see Brown, 
2015). Chief amongst these cultural changes is total 
bureaucratisation: “the imposition of impersonal rules 
and regulations […] backed up by the threat of force” 
(Graeber, 2015, p. 32) over every aspect of daily life, 
in such a pervasive manner that people cannot 
imagine things could be done differently. As a result 
of this process, bureaucracy has become “the water 
in which we swim” (2015, p. 4) and every resource, 
particularly technological change (a.k.a. “innovation”) 
has been put to the service of management. So 
although in the minds of those belonging to the 
managerial class, both private and public 
organisations now prioritise creativity and innovation 
thanks to them, reality shows the exact opposite is 
true. 
Instead of investing in technologies that could bring 
alternative, more egalitarian futures, organisations 
have prioritised the development of more 
sophisticated systems to increase further “labour 
discipline and social control” (Graeber, 2015, p. 120). 
Organisations have not addressed the challenges 
famously identified by Keynes (1930/2011) almost a 
hundred years ago. Nor have they brought more 
radical changes such as establishing a “four-hour 
workweek” or universal income, nor developed 
fantastic innovations such as building flying cars, and 
colonies on the Moon. Instead, we ended up with 
infallible ATMs, high-speed trading, and an unhealthy 
enthusiasm for surveillance devices that would put 
the Stasi to shame. 
Rather than fulfilling the ideals of Ted Nelson (1974) 
or Stewart Brand, [12] and freeing us from 
administrative responsibilities, software and 
ubiquitous computing have “turned us all into part or 
full-time administrators” (Graeber, 2015, p. 140). 
What could otherwise be “poetic technologies” have 
become “bureaucratic technologies” (2015, p. 141). 
Even more worrying is the fact that the humanistic 
panoply deployed by UCD, which in many ways 
contributed to widespread adoption of computing in 
the last decades, is serving to perpetuate not only this 
state of affairs but, as we will see next, a false sense 
of augmented agency. 
4 | AGAINST A FALSE SENSE OF AUGMENTED 
AGENCY 
Surveillance capitalism and the type of technologies 
this system fosters are fundamentally bureaucratic. 
Bureaucracy is, by definition, arbitrary, inflexible, 
alienating, inefficient, and taxing (in the broad 
meaning of the word). Nonetheless, bureaucratic 
procedures are often justified by claiming that they 
will achieve precisely the contrary: that they will make 
procedures cheaper, expedite, transparent, and 
meritocratic. Bureaucratic procedures replace 
organic tête-à-tête negotiation and bargaining (which 
presuppose some form of symmetrical relationship 
between actors) with reductive, generalised 
imperatives (grounded on hierarchies and 
asymmetries) that follow the simple formulation “if, 
then, else”. Bureaucracy, like violence in general, is 
fundamentally unimaginative. Violence allows people 
to get away with arbitrary actions; to replace the 
negotiations and clarifications expected to occur 
within more egalitarian human exchanges with 
schematic imperatives. That is why no amount of 
rhetorical imaginative effort can efficiently counter the 
simplicity of a threat such as “cross the line and I will 
shoot you” (Graeber, 2015).  
Despite the above, to the best of our knowledge, 
humans have the unique capacity to picture things in 
their mind’s eye; consequently, we can project our 
ideas and ourselves into hypothetical past and future 
scenarios. This means that unless we have some 
damage in our frontal lobes, we can put ourselves in 
other people’s shoes and imagine what it would be 
like to stand in their position. This requires 
interpreting, understanding, and (to varying degrees) 
caring for other people, their circumstances, and 
needs. Bureaucracy, on the other hand, is imposed 
as a remedy against the above; as a substitute for the 
myriad complex exchanges and negotiations that 
people need to carry out when interacting with other 
people. 
Bureaucratic procedures are imposed to manage 
relationships that are already extremely unequal in 
terms of interpretative (empathic) labour. 
Bureaucracy embodies and institutionalises “lopsided 
structures of the imagination”. Thus, as Graeber 
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(2015) contends, bureaucracy is not so much an 
embodiment of stupidity but a way to manage 
circumstances that are stupid because they depend 
on pre-existing inequalities underpinned by structural 
violence. Power allows people to behave crassly 
towards other people. Those in a situation of power 
and privilege tend to unabashedly avoid engaging in 
imaginative identification, particularly towards people 
they see as their inferiors. Attempting to imagine how 
their subordinates feel is nothing short of a burden; 
after all, “in most ways, most of the time, power is all 
about what you don’t have to worry about, don’t have 
to know about, and don’t have to do” (2015, p. 101). 
Imaginative, emphatic, and caring labour is usually 
the responsibility of people serving those in the upper 
echelons of society. After all, servants are people who 
have to anticipate the needs, desires, whims, and 
moods of those in power; whereas in turn these “can 
wander about largely oblivious to much of what is 
going on around them” (2015, p. 81). 
The current trends in IoT consumer technologies 
seem focused on generalising precisely such 
bureaucratic/lopsided attitude towards the world. 
Only this time, the interpreting labour is carried out by 
smart devices. The emergence of various AI personal 
assistants (Alexa, Google Assistant, Siri, and 
Cortana) and smart environments (e.g., Kohler’s 
Numi 2.0 or Whirlpool’s smart kitchens) exemplify 
such trend. Smart, voice-controlled systems that 
unlock doors, regulate temperature and lights, play 
music or do our laundry simulate the kind of 
relationship plutocrats have with those around them. 
Tech companies such as Google, Amazon, and Apple 
are engaged in a cutthroat competition to make AI-
powered devices that offer more people the sensation 
of having the world respond to their desires, that is, 
transforming the luxuries of the plutocracy into 
affordable necessities even for those in the lower 
strata of society. This form of privileged augmented 
agency [13] (having one’s whims satisfied by an 
artificial agent at the sleight of one’s hand), however, 
comes at a cost that far exceeds the benefits. 
These systems can potentially realise such 
(distorted) utopia not because they are outstandingly 
prescient but, as was earlier discussed, thanks to the 
massive amounts of data extracted from the very 
people they are sold to. For the plutocrat the 
underling is disposable and easily replaceable; 
regardless of how intimate or longstanding their 
relationship might have been, there is no doubt about 
who holds power. Conversely, the power (and liberty 
of choice) the average Joe has over his growing 
network of Alexa-controlled devices is, at best, 
illusory. What might seem as an innocuous 
indulgence is, in reality, a key element in the kind of 
Faustian pacts encouraged by surveillance 
capitalism. Using an Alexa-controlled musical toilet 
that lifts its cover and washes and dries one’s rear 
end grants Amazon the possibility of, say, creating a 
schedule of one’s bowel movements and selling it to 
data brokers for whatever purpose. As of today, IoT 
devices are not providing kinetic powers but rather a 
false consciousness sense of augmented agency. In 
the age of surveillance capitalism tailoring is 
tantamount to encroachment, the kind that only an 
extremely efficient spy can get off with. 
Surveillance capitalism and bureaucratic 
technologies are not only generalising a false sense 
of augmented agency; they are hampering human 
capacity to self-transformation. Previously, we saw 
that from the perspective of contemporary philosophy 
of technology, a defining feature of human beings is 
that we self-fabricate our lives, that we can regard our 
existence as a technical enterprise or rather, as a 
design process. Designing is an activity concerned 
with problem-solving, planning and projection, but its 
defining feature is iteration, a reliance on feedback 
loops. Machines and tools are objects ideally 
conceived “to defeat the world’s resistance” (Flusser, 
1991/2014, p. 14), to overcome our “natural” 
limitations by augmenting or enhancing our physical 
or cognitive capacities. As intrinsically artificial 
creatures, we are the sum of the technological 
enhancements we choose to incorporate in our lives 
(Pitt, 2011), and these include everything from our 
means of transportation to our clothing and 
entertainment. In many ways, we are our 
technologies. As we progress in life, we experiment, 
we tinker with myriads of such choices, we test and 
see whether they fit in our lives and contribute or not 
to what we wish to become. Ideally, throughout this 
process, we make adjustments and corrections, we 
engage in a feedback loop, not unlike those 
characterising every design project. This formulation 
assumes that we have not only the capacity to choose 
but the means to evaluate our choices. However, in 
this age, this possibility is becoming the exception 
rather than the rule. 
Under the guise of customisation, bureaucratic 
technologies are curtailing human freedom of 
choice—all the while promoting the idea that we have 
too many choices, as the “FOBO” phenomenon 
suggests (Reagle, 2015). Through the appropriation 
of users’ behavioural data—which companies regard 
as a free-range resource “for the taking”—to create 
tradable “prediction products” (Zuboff, 2019), most 
tech companies relying on Big Data aim to manipulate 
user’s decisions. As noted earlier, the economic 
model pioneered by Google has been adopted not 
only by FAANGS, but by virtually every other 
company selling insurance, healthcare, retail, 
entertainment, education, finance, and other services 
(2019). As Zuboff suggests, any IoT product currently 
labelled as “smart” is either already playing a role in 
the behavioural data supply-chain or is capable of 
doing so. Major companies and data brokers are 
continually working their way to circumvent obstacles 
against data collection, including users’ explicit 
rejection; for example, by gathering inference data 
from public sources and users’ unrelated activities—
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particularly from so-called “data exhaust”. Under such 
conditions, users do not have access nor control over 
their behavioural data and how it is being interpreted 
and for which ends. As Zuboff points out, we are not 
only being “exiled” from our own behaviour but from 
the “knowledge” it yields (Naughton, 2019). This 
circumstance highlights yet another divide 
characterising surveillance capitalism: an asymmetric 
relationship between those who know (but hide 
behind inscrutable and often dangerously biased 
“algorithms”) and those who are known and for whom 
privacy is no longer a right but a luxury. 
The type of social relations that emerge within 
surveillance capitalism resemble those of pre-modern 
absolutism where territory and rights are 
concentrated on a single entity. Big Tech is rapidly 
depriving people of their liberty to choose which 
information about their lives remains undisclosed. 
What these organisations are accumulating is not 
only “surveillance assets”—i.e., data and the 
technical means to handle it—and capital, but also 
human rights (Naughton, 2019). This appropriation 
and exploitation of informational resources also have 
a territorial dimension. Big Tech has claimed 
ownership of the “Infosphere”, the expanding 
environment inhabited by humans and other 
informational agents resulting from the merger of our 
physical world and our “onlife” (Floridi, 2005, 2007). 
For Zuboff (2015), this appropriation echoes the 
plundering of the so-called New World started half a 
millennia ago. [14] 
For Big Tech, it is no longer enough to automate 
information flows about their users; nowadays, they 
seek to surreptitiously automate their behaviour too 
by manipulating their contexts. (Naughton, 2019). As 
the world becomes more enveloped by smart 
devices, we find ourselves continuously ambushed 
by nudges [15]. Having our decisions micromanaged 
and our choices engineered means we are being 
denied access to our own experiential feedback loop. 
This in turn means that our capacity to design 
ourselves, to tinker and explore other possibilities of 
being-with-technologies is severely hampered. 
In these days and age, we are our information and 
what becomes of it (Floridi, 2014). Since technologies 
hold such power over what we are, it is vital to 
imagine new ways in which we can establish a 
healthier, freer relationship with them. However, first 
we ought to question and challenge the inevitability 
that surveillance capitalism has attached to 
information technologies (ITs). Surveillance 
capitalism and protection of privacy are 
fundamentally incompatible, and surely neither total 
bureaucratisation nor surveillance capitalism could 
have existed without ITs, but it does not follow that 
ITs are to blame for their existence. The emergence 
of services designed with privacy in mind is proof 
there is an economical alternative to Google’s “free” 
surveillance assets. 
Bureaucratic thinking (purely concerned with 
procedures) has taken over our relationship with 
technologies, and hence over our capacity to change 
according to our own designs. In our daily struggle to 
work out our existence (and hence to transform our 
environment) we now hardly ever question the 
motives for incorporating a given technology into our 
lives. Designers, even those subscribing to UCD, are 
no longer questioning the ontological and 
deontological dimensions of technologies but are 
merely caring about the methodological aspects of it. 
To paraphrase Flusser (2014a), they are leaving 
aside the “what’s” and “why’s” of our technological 
needs to focus solely on the “how’s”. 
As it is currently being imagined and instantiated, 
automation is not one that brings more leisure time, a 
healthier, safer, environmentally sound, and 
egalitarian society where human autonomy is 
nurtured for good. Arguably, then, we need some way 
to challenge this status quo; to reclaim the role of our 
technologies from bureaucracy and turn them once 
again into poetic tools. To use bureaucracy and 
technologies “to bring wild, impossible fantasies to 
life” (Graeber, 2015, p. 141). What we are missing is 
ways to imagine different relationships with our 
technologies but also the means (concepts) to talk 
about our shifting circumstances. Whenever we 
confront the unknown, the first task we need to 
accomplish is naming, for “naming is the first step 
toward taming” (Naughton, 2019). That is why we 
need insights into the true nature of the phenomena 
that is changing our world in such radical ways. 
Criticisms such as Zuboff’s and Graeber’s provide a 
sociological framework for contextualising our 
critique, but something else is also missing: the 
capacity to imagine how things could be different. 
Technologically informed philosophical reflection 
understood as conceptual design (Floridi, 2013), 
might take us a long way into that objective. 
5 | CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Surveillance capitalism and the type of technologies 
that it is fostering are fundamentally bureaucratic. 
Current trends in IoT consumer services are 
generalising a false sense of augmented agency that 
mimics the lopsided, unimaginative and careless 
relationship plutocracies establish with the world 
around them. Promising to transform the seemingly 
innocuous laziness of the powerful into an accessible 
necessity, bureaucratic technologies are forcing 
people into nothing short of Faustian pacts. By 
incorporating systems designed to extract as much 
behavioural data from them to predict and influence 
their behaviour, users of bureaucratic technologies 
are surrendering their capacity to self-transform; to 
develop as individuals. Bureaucratic technologies are 
alienating users from their own experiences, from the 
uncertainties that help nurture constructive existential 
feedback loops. This, of course, is not the way such 
powerful technologies should operate. 
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Philosophical reflection, in general, can help to 
challenge this state of affairs by instilling doubts about 
notions that are taken for granted, but also by 
designing new conceptual tools to understand current 
technological changes. Philosophy of technology 
provides a critical framework embraces the 
multistable nature of technologies and recognises 
their role as fundamental components of human 
nature. This critical mindset should be used to 
question why AI, its current and future operational 
limitations and consequences are often 
misrepresented or deliberately obfuscated (e.g., by 
equating intelligence with capacity to predict) to 
promote dishonest forms of automation. 
Furthermore, we need to direct our criticism towards 
current practices in design. We need to challenge and 
update frameworks such as UCD and rethink what 
“user’s needs” mean in the age of smart automation, 
and what kind of trade-offs we are assuming in the 
name of supposedly unobtrusive devices. A 
genuinely humanistic UCD should make sure 
humans are kept on the loop. User experience should 
imply a richer instead of a narrower understanding of 
the world; it should mean more agency and 
autonomy, rather than nudging, and manipulation. A 
truly rich technologically mediated human experience 
should favour not bureaucracy, coercion, and control; 
but rather possibilities for creating and imagining new 
ways to be. The analysis here offered is currently at 
an initial stage and there is still much work to do.  
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ENDNOTES 
[1] The nefarious consequences of dishonest 
automation are particularly visible in Politics, as 
shown by a recent study on the influence of 
YouTube’s optimisation algorithm on political and 
health debates in Brazil (Fischer & Taub, 2019). 
[2] Graeber (2015) is referring to “the use of rational 
and technical means to bring wild fantasies to reality”. 
“Fantasies” here meaning building pyramids and 
transcontinental railroads or exploring space. 
[3] For a full description of the differences between 
historical and posthistorical societies see Floridi 
(2014 ch.1). Floridi’s concept is roughly equivalent to 
Flusser’s (1985/2011) conception of “posthistory”; for 
a thorough comparison see Galanos (2016). 
[4] Here, automation is being understood broadly as 
outsourcing physical or cognitive tasks to an artificial 
system (Danaher, 2018). 
[5] Datafication differs from digitisation, insofar as the 
latter merely involves turning an analogue signal into 
bits; whereas the former implies an explanatory or 
hermeneutical desire to quantify, record, and interpret 
phenomena. For a critical view on datafication, see 
van Dijck (2014). 
[6] Datasets may undergo various similar cycles. 
Once processed, a dataset may be re-packaged by 
data brokers, sold, further analysed, and then sold 
again (Zuboff, 2015). 
[7] Although there is no definitive consensual 
definition of Big Data, the term often serves as a 
shorthand for the combination of (a) technical 
infrastructure (information processing hardware) and 
(b) techniques for gathering, sorting, and querying 
vast amounts of data at high speeds. By adopting Big 
Data schemes and practices, organisations seek to 
discover new patterns in systems’ behaviours, distil 
them into “predictive analytics” and apply the resulting 
information onto new datasets (Yeung, 2016). 
[8] An alternative acronym, “GAFAM” places 
Microsoft instead of Netflix and Spotify. 
[9] For Heidegger (1954/1977a), technological 
rationality embodied in the notion of Gestell induces 
us to see everything in the world, including ourselves, 
as resources that can be put to the service of a 
technological system. This utilitarian mindset is 
dangerous because it “undermines our creative 
engagement with reality, alienates us from ourselves 
and each other, and leads to the destruction of our 
habitat” (Merwin, Wendland, & Hadjioannou, 2018, p. 
1). 
[10] Here, “autonomy” is being understood in the 
broad sense of completing a given process from start 
to finish without the need of human intervention and 
oversight beyond the establishment of the initial 
course of action (Johnson & Verdicchio, 2017). Thus 
put, a bow and arrow, a windmill, and a self-driving 
car are autonomous. 
[11] As Ihde & Malafouris (2018) further note, “the 
kind of minds we have depend on the kind of tools we 
make and use”. This echoes Nietzsche’s alleged 
claim that “our tools are also working on our thoughts” 
(in Kittler, 1999). 
[12] In the late 1960s Brand, editor of the Whole Earth 
Catalogue (published between 1968 and 1972), and 
the most visible voice for the so-called “New 
Communalists” (Campbell-Kelly, Aspray, 
Ensmenger, & Yost, 2014), along with Nelson 
advocated widespread adoption of computational 
technology. Deeply influenced by Norbert Wiener, 
McLuhan, Buckminster Fuller and Vannevar Bush, 
Brand and Nelson regarded computers as powerful 
DIY tools for achieving personal liberty and 
happiness. 
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[13] Here, “agency” is broadly understood as the 
capacity of an agent to bring about specific changes 
in the world; this implies the agent can decide to act 
(or not), choose to do it in a certain way, and execute 
the action (Bunnin & Yu, 2009). 
[14] As Zuboff notes, now that surveillance capitalism 
has become more visible, the term “digital native” has 
gained bleakly ironic overtone. 
[15] As Yeung (2016) argues, since Big Data 
analytics can be updated and tweaked in real-time, 
they represent a far more powerful tool for 
behavioural tinkering, than the type of nudging 
originally advocated by Thaler & Sunstein (2008). 
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